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only way he could terminate the book, since
the action points toward no natural conclusion.
While Wolfe failed at making the transition
from real-life action to fictional plot, he has
succeeded at making the other transitions from reports of real people to fictional characterization, from personal narration to fictional
point-of-view, from self-conscious language to
style which undergirds the rest of the fiction.
And most of all from the personal statement
of non-fiction to the representation of reality
- and moral position - of the best fiction.
Though he hasn't said it in public, Wolfe's
novel suggests he has decided that fiction may
be truer than real life - the basic belief of all
good novelists.
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Marion Montgomery, Possum, and Other
Receits for the Recovery of "Southern" Being,
Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia
Press, 1987. 158 pages.
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If a powerful computer endowed with artificial intelligence programming could interface
with Marion Montgomery and enter everything from his mind into its memory, could
it write this book? Montgomery's association
of the recipe for cooking possum with the
Latin possum, representing for him the ability or potency of the individual person, seems
arbitrary enough that the computer might
arrive at it. But the machine would be unable to see a way of fleshing out this strange
connection to make of it a compelling discourse. Why? Because the computer has no
heart, which is, as Montgomery claims, the

source of vision, as opposed to the brain's reason. I would add that the computer has no
body. It cannor see how to flesh out ideas
because it has no eyes and no flesh. In fact,
in spite of our anthropomorphic terminology,
it cannot "interface" with a person because
it has no face, and its information storage is
nothing like our memory because it has never
experienced anything.
This book, originally given as the Lamar
Memorial Lectures at Mercer University, is
not about artificial intelligence in computers.
But it is about artificial intelligence in human
beings, the kind of thinking (designated
metaphorically as "Northern") that is divorced
from a sense of place, of particular reality.
Montgomery follows St. Thomas Aquinas in
dividing the mind into ratio and intellectus.
Ratio is pure reason, which attempts to reduce
nature and human nature to abstractions, and
finally to number, so that both may be controlled and even redesigned. Intellectus is the
intuitive or visionary side of the mind, the
heart. Montgomery follows T. S. Eliot in arguing that a "dissociation of sensibility" took
place in the latter part of the Renaissance,
divorcing thought and feeling. The Western
world, in this view, has increasingly adopted
Ockham's nominalism, asserting more and
more flatly that the relation between human
language and reality is entirely arbitrary.
Another thinker Montgomery often calls
upon is Eric Voegelin, who termed this
intellectual malady "the new gnosticism." As
the theistic gnosticism of the early Christian
era divorced spirit and flesh, the modern
atheistic gnosticism privileges abstract, critical thinking over intuitive, analogical insight.
Surprisingly, our increasing reliance on pure
abstraction results not only in reduced awareness of the world around us but also in abject
materialism. No paradox here: the purest
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abstraction translates reality into numbers,
not names; and matter appears to be reducible to number, while spirit can hardly even
be named. Along these lines, I thought I had
detected an inconsistency when Montgomery
proclaimed gnostic dualism to be "as ancient
as Adam's being required to name the creatures in an old Garden" (p. 24), but he later
revises this evaluation in advancing his belief
that names are not, finally, arbitrary (pp. 33,
87).
The most direct influence on Montgomery's
thinking comes evidently from the Vanderbilt Fugitives. The alternate term for them,
"Agrarians," emphasizes the notion that
writers must be rooted in the land at some
particular place. Montgomery sees himself following those earlier Southern poets in being
a "prophetic poet" who describes, not the
future, but the evils of the present which may
pollute the future. If at the beginning of the
book this title sounds grandiose, it seems to
have been earned by the end. Montgomery
does flesh out his ideas so as to make the
reader see the danger into which we fall when,
in trying to think critically and dispassionately, we silence our intuitions and ignore our
visions.
Montgomery is no doubt called a conservative. He may be quite willing to accept the
label, since all prophets seek to conserve (or
revive) an endangered sense of communal
values. Still, it should be noted that his views
are no more amenable to capitalist materialism than they are to the Marxist variety: both
ideologies love numbers, not people. He
points out that the Agrarians were criticized
from left and right, and he evidently expects
as much himself. All the same, he is certain
to make more enemies among the many
liberals who believe that they love humanity
but who tend to define that term as a grow-
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ing population of highly intelligent animals
who must be better managed if the species is
to survive. Above all, Montgomery marks
himself as a non-liberal when he turns to theology and poetry rather than the social
sciences for enlightenment concerning the
human condition (p. 127). In practicing the
old liberal arts instead of the new liberal
sciences, he alienates himself from most contemporary liberalism.
Possum embodies the integration of heart
and head it champions. It also integrates a
variety of disciplines, ranging from theology
and philosophy through literary criticism to
history and social criticism. The book gives
a profound review of our intellectual tradition
and engages the enduring questions in their
present manifestations. Old readers of Montgomery may find little that is entirely new to
them but will be gladdened by the novel applications and connections; new readers of his
will discover a writer who treats the important questions with rigor, vitality, and a
respect for the mystery and complexity of
existence.
What more could one desire? Perhaps some
mention of C. S. Lewis, whose Abolition of
Man similarly warns against the tendency of
"men without chests" to aim at controlling
not only nature but also human nature. On
the need for rootedness, he might have turned
not to Saint Thomas but to Saint Francis, a
poet whose mysticism was expressed in love
of the created world around him, and who
commanded his brothers always to return to
the Portiuncula, the "little portion" of earth
where his mission began.
I would also like to see Montgomery apply
his critique to the deconstructionist' school of
literary criticism. Perhaps he alludes to the
deconstructionists' reductio ad absurdum of
nominalism when he explains that the prime
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objective of the new gnosticism is
to acquire and use power over being. From
that principle it follows as a first necessity
the deconstruction of reality, the separation
of mind into an autonomy independent of
reality. (p. 108)
Quite possibly he has spoken on this subject
in review articles which I have not read, but
this book would seem to offer a secure vantage point from which to see what poststructuralists are about. It would be most
interesting to watch those critics chew on the
Southern recipe for possum.
Montgomery for some reason stops short of
talking about the body. The Fathers who
combatted the ancient gnosticism spoke of the
sanctity of the body itself. Origen insisted that
our glorified body would not be different in
essence from our present body. T ertullian
proclaimed that "The flesh is the hinge of salvation." Augustine raised as the prime mystery what T. S. Eliot also came to recognize
as such: "The hint half guessed, the gifr half
understood, is Incarnation." The Apostles'
Creed expresses this teaching, confronting
dualism with belief in "the resurrection of the
body." More recently, theologians have again
begun to insist on the integrity of mind and
body in face of the new gnosticism. If Montgomery insists only on head and heart as
integral to our essence, he will himself remain
partially susceptible to modern gnosticism.
Intellectus is partly located in the brain (wholly
so, some rationalists suggest): those feelings in
the chest which are bound up with imagination and intuition perhaps connect the onedimensional, serial function of the brain with
the three-dimensionality of the body, without
which there would be no metaphor, no vision.
All this may be implied in Possum, but it is
never stated. Pressing the question down to
the level of the flesh would also force fuller

consideration of certain moral issues. For
example, I wonder whether Montgomery
would consider contraception to be another
manifestation of the modern dualism.
Finally, as refreshing as it is to find someone speaking of"community" instead of"society," one might wish for a more complete
exposition of the nature of community than
is given in Montgomery's suggestive "Afterword." What does bind those persons
together? While we may agree that Faulkner's
Miss Emily binds a community more surely
than Nashville's replica of the Parthenon, we
desire a healthier community than hers.
When Montgomery asserts that the community must be dependent upon the prophetic
poet (p. 129), I wonder if he may not finally
be burdening himself with a kind of authority
that is more properly placed elsewhere. The
prophet awakens the conscience of a community, but whose office is it to unite and direct
the community and maintain its continuity?
In short, I would like to see Montgomery
press some of these ideas a step further. Still,
I rejoice to have read a book that reveals the
heartlessness of much modern intellectualism
as brilliantly as this one does. Montgomery
can be called a reactionary only if by that one
means an angry prophet. He rejects, not computers, but the temptation to remake ourselves in the image of the machine we have
made. He quotes an unnamed academic
leader as saying that the goal of the academy
is the "reprogramming of nature." Montgomery cries out that neither nature nor
human nature is unmysterious and mechanical enough to be treated that way: "except by
fundamental destruction, existence is not to
be reduced out of time to the control of gnosis incarnate, the computer" (p. 109).
Benjamin G. Lockerd, Jr.
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